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for improvement are welcome. Quotations should be
cleared with the author."Particularly in these trying times it is necessary to
keep the domestic markets - on all sides - free from
(trade) restrictions. International trade must be able
to fulfill its role in ... maintaining the competitive
edge of our industries and in creating secure jobs" .
"Last year's increase in the minimum wage is evidence of
our concern for the welfare of our low-income fellow
citizens. Other legislative proposals . . . will be par-
ticularly effective" in improving the lot of the least
fortunate" ,
I. Introduction
The above quotes exemplify quite well the strange world in
which we live: on the one hand governments over the last 30
years have generally attempted to enact measures to liberal-
ize international trade (and as a matter of fact the move-
ment of factors of production) so as to be able to profit -
in the form of higher employment levels - from a more
efficient allocation of resources. On the other hand, in
many of the same countries governments (and/or unions) have
effected (or supported) measures for domestic labor markets,
the impact of which runs counter to the expected gains from
a reduction in trade barriers. In other words, while a rapid
expansion of international trade may have contributed
significantly to creating employment, measures affecting the
training, employment, remuneration and/or social security of
the working-age population may well have caused jobs or job
opportunities to disappear or job-seeking activities to be
otherwise structured.
To be sure, governments didn't institute such policies with-
out having been forewarned about the possible negative em-
ployment effects they might induce. After all, for instance,
Chancellor Helmut Kohl during ceremonies commemorating the
twentieth anniversary of the German-French treaty on
cooperation, Paris, January 21, 1983.
2
Economic Report of the President, 1962, p. 10.Stigler's classical 1946 article succinctly outlined the
negative impact of minimum wages on employment and income
levels of those supposed to be explicitly helped by such a
measure. However, despite the empirical evidence most policy-
makers (as shown by the above quote from the Economic Report
of the President) have remained inflicted with social
policy illusion and were.thus convinced of the positive
welfare effect they would induce.
Furthermore, in some cases rapid economic growth accompanied
the introduction of measures impacting on the labor market -
be they either influencing the demand for work (e.g. unem-
ployment compensation) or the demand for labor (e.g. unions/
minimum wages) - masked over their initial impact. However,
as the expansion of economic acitivity slowed down, the
adjustment to the new parameters began to become apparent -
a situation aggravated in many countries by demographically
and socio-economically induced increases in labor supply.
In light of the high unemployment rates already reached -
generally the second highest this century (see Table 1) -
and given the growth expectations over the coming years - it
would seem to be a worthwhile task to review some of the
measures introduced by modern welfare societies and affect-
ing the labor market (either directly or indirectly), to
attempt to locate areas where wage rigidities and/or
barriers to entry can be eliminated to allow for a more
efficient allocation of resources as well as a greater
utilization. The paper is divided into three major sections,
whereby the first section deals with general comments, the
second with specific empirical evidence and the third with
possible solutions to the problems expounded upon.
II. Distortions in the Labor Market - General Comments
Given the basic driving force - i.e. the competitive spirit
- behind the workings of market economies, where it is as-... 3 -
Table 1 - Unemployment Rates and Population Growth in
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Source: Various national statistics.- 4 -
sumed that households seek to maximize their utility, that
firms seek to maximize their profits and where wages/prices
are supposed to be flexible enough to signal relative short-
age surpluses, policies and behavior which interfere with
the functioning of this mechanism will cause employment
problems to occur.
Where do these interferences come from? Since, as Schumpeter
(1954, p. 270) pointed out, mass unemployment was virtually
unknown in the middle ages, we are confronted with an out-
growth of modern civilization. That is, as economies have
become increasingly complex and the immediate connection
between the buyers and the sellers of labour disappeared,
and as the time periods for intertemporal decisions
lengthened so that exogeneous factors became more difficult
to define, the probability that imbalances between the
supply of and demand for labor would occur increased.
Further increasing these probabilities - and this brings us
to the specific topic of this paper - has been the
establishment of institutions (e.g. unions and pressure
groups) capable of imposing their interests on societies as
well as the introduction of laws and regulations (e.g.
welfare and tax laws) prompting the traditional societal
pressures to give way to more individual utility aspects or
inducing a reaction because governments have usurped areas
beyond concensus delimitations (e.g. the underground
economy).
If these considerations in general are relevant, then - as a
starting point for the empirical evidence and before moving
onto an examination of specific measures - it could well be
hypothesized that - given certain macroeconomic parameters -
employment problems will have tended to increase less in
those countries where overall levels of interference have
been the lowest. To examine this hypothesis data on six OECD
countries (France, Germany, Great Britain, Italy, Japan and
United States) have been gathered and plotted over time- 5 -
(i.e. since 1960, whereby 1960 = 100). Employment problems
are represented by unemployment rates. Interferences are not
captured directly but rather assumed to be portrayed by
three (not entirely independent) indicators. The first one
is an index number based on a ratio between average wage per
employee (including all fringe benefits) and average pro-
ductivity per employee. It is expected that the degree to
which governments and pressure groups were able to influence
the enaction and spread of social and work-related benefits,
these are picked up in the wage series. To the extent that
productivity doesn't increase at a comparable rate it can be
expected that employment levels will eventually be nega-
tively influenced. The second indicator is supposed to
capture the impact of government activities on the economy
and is estimated by dividing total government outlays by
GDP. It is assumed that the usurping of factors of pro-
duction and financial assets causes a crowding out of
private, more productive economic activities (at least from
the offical economy). Hence, over the longer run a positive
correlation is expected between increases in levels of
government activities and increases in employment problems .
The third indicator is meant to capture the impact of the
various measures and government activities on profit rates.
It is assumed that the extent to which profits from private
enterprises decrease vis-a-vis invested capital, the will-
ingness of prospective entrepreneurs to invest in new ven-
tures will likewise decrease. Thus new employment oppor-
tunities will not be forthcoming.
In addition to these indicators of interferences affecting
the labor market three statistics portraying the overall
economic environment are included. First of all, the growth
In this connection it is assumed that it has exceeded some
level below which government activities fulfill an essen-
tial function in increasing economic efficiency. For a
discussion of the problems involved and impact over time
see Glismann et al. (1983).- 6 -
of the labor force reveals how many new jobs need to be
created if - ceteris paribus - employment problems are not
to increase. Second, the development of real GDP is shown to
be able to relevate developments between countries. Third,
the relative international competitive position - i.e. real
effective exchange rate changes - has been included to at-
tempt to point to the degree of shifts in this position .
The results of this exercise, which can be seen in Diagram
1, conform quite well with expectations, particularly if
attention is paid to the trend in various periods as well as
to the interconnection with the indicators of the overall
2
economic environment . In comparing the United States with
Germany for instance, one finds that employment problems
have increased far less in the former than in the latter
although in the U.S. the labor force rose by over 50% - in
Germany it was virtually stationary. The answer can be found
particularly in the interplay in the 1970s between the
wage/productivity, profit rate and government share indices.
In the U.S. the wage/productivity index remained flat in the
1970s but in Germany it increased by 30%. Profit rates in
Germany sank from 1960 to 1975 and have recovered but little
since then, but in the U.S. they were higher at the end of
the 1970s than one or two decades earlier. As concerns the
governments' share of GDP we find that it has increased
considerably more in Germany than in the U.S. Additional
negative impulses for Germany emanated from an increase in
the effective real exchange rate changes (i.e. decrease in
competitive position) while the U.S. even went through a
devaluation, hence a positive factor for labor markets.
For sure the international competitive position comprises
more than just actual exchange rates, as not only the
right products must be offered, but also non-pecuniary
factors like reputation, reliability and future delivery
capability (i.e. risk for strikes) should be considered.
2
That differences in the reaction pattern between countries
can be perceived should not be surprising.— 7 —
150
Diagrom 1:
Unemployment, its Determinants and the Economic Environment
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With but few exceptions - which can be explained by the
special situation in the various countries (e.g. Japan and
'paternalistic' labor market and Italy where the unemploy-
ment rate hardly changed due to migration into the under-
ground economy) - the evidence would seem to allow the hypo-
thesized impact to be considered confirmed, if only in a
'soft' way, i.e. backed up by graphical reasoning rather
than high-powered econometric methods. If the basic hypo- [
thesis holds up in general, then the examination can turn to
some of the specific measures which lie behind the indi-
vidual curves.
III. Distortions in the Labor Market - Specific Measures
The labor market - as used in this paper - describes that
nebulous area in which decisions affecting the amount of
labor (work) to be supplied and the amount of labor to be
demanded are made (see Diagram 2).
Decisions on the supply side are made by people not cur-
rently in the active labor force as well as those working
full time. The decisions can be aimed at retiring from the
active labor force (e.g. to procure more education), moving
from a full-time job to job-seeking activities (e.g. if
unemployment compensation and/or non-work activities would
make it seem more profitable) or even changing locations.
Whatever the case, the determinant behind all such decisions
can be assumed to be the attempt to maximize the flow of
lifetime income (consisting of pecuniary and non-pecuniary
elements).
On the labor demand side - derived from the demand for goods
via production needs -, it is (as mentioned above) the pro-
fit motive which determines the amount and type of labor to
be combined with a given capital stock or determines how- 9 -
Diagram 2 : LABOR MARKET FLOWS
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much capital should be substituted for labor or even whether
capital should be exported.
To analyze the interferences two groupings - I and IV - have
been selected from a listing of major policies impacting the
labor market - structured according to the thrust of the
i .
policy *
I. Directly influencing pay levels
Legal minimum wages,
Contract minimum wages and lump sum pay increases.
II. Directed toward job rights
Employment security,
- Antidiscrimination legislation.







It ought to be noted that the major headings should not be
interpreted as only representing the subheadings in accord-
ance with the intended goal. For instance, although pay
levels are directly affected by minimum wages, minimum wages
are intended to have a social impact.
This breakdown is in line with Donges, Spinanger (1983),
in which an overview of all these groups is contained.- 11 -
I. Directly influencing pay levels
Minimum wages; with the advent of public concern for employ-
ment conditions in the course of the last century, govern-
ments and unions began to direct attention towards the ad-
equacy of wages to maintain a socially accepted minimum
income level. Had the policymakers in the last century done
their economic homework they would have known that setting
fixed wages 'hinders the one from working at what he thinks
proper, (and) hinders the others from employing whom they
think proper.' (Smith, 1776, vol. I, p. 138). But at the end
of a century laden with tales of human suffering and social
upheavals, the attempt to effect some minimum wage level was
probably inevitable. While initially aimed at sweatshop
conditions (e.g. Australia in 1896 ) but also in connection
with working conditions for women and children (e.g. the
2
United States in 1912) , minimum wage legislation today is
usually sold as a social policy to shore up wages of workers
with little or no bargaining power and to guarantee a min-
imum income .
No matter what reason is given for minimum wages, the evi-
dence does not support the contention that it represents
an efficient measure . In connection with the laws passed in
For a brief overview sea West, McKee (1980) pp. 1-11.
2
An interesting description of the early U.S. legislation
can be found in Broda (1928).
For a summary of existing legislation in some OECD coun-
tries see OECD (1982) pp. 53-56.
4
The most recent study done by Martin (1983) under the
auspices of the OECD concludes that the North American
literature - and own calculations - show that minimum
wages produce unemployment and are ineffective in reducing
poverty. While the OECD can hardly be considered to be an
organization which hastily and recklessly arrives at con-
clusions, the ILO in an earlier (Starr, 1981) comes to a
different conclusion. Here the wealth of studies is seen
by the ILO as providing inclusive evidence which must be- 12 -
Australia Lees-Smith (1907) broached issues which were later
systematically dealt with by Stigler (1946) and Machlup
(1946, 1947). The central issue in most of the numerous
theoretical and empirical articles has been the employment/
unemployment effects, be it in connection with the level of
minimum wages, their coverage, interaction with transfer
payments and/or labor market behavior (see Brown et al.
(1982, 1983), Rottenberg (1981), Spinanger (1978) and
sources therein). Nearly all the empirical studies tend to
show that minimum wages induce unemployment and greater'
cyclical unemployment movements for those groups (youths,
particularly minority groups) whose wage levels would -
without factor market distortions (i.e. minimum wages) - be
lower .
Two aspects with regard to the impact of minimum wages would
seem to be worthwhile underlining:
- the extent to which minimum wage increases cause persons
to leave the active labor force because the probability of
finding a job has become too small,
- the degree to which the crowding out of the least
competitive labor force cohorts from areas covered by
minimum wages and their crowding into areas not covered or
less covered by minimum wages.
As concerns the first point it has already been shown
graphically by Spinanger (1978, p. 240) that shifts in the
labor force participation rates (LFPR) of certain youth
cohorts were highly correlated with changes in minimum
continued from p. 9: reexamined so the doubts about the
effectiveness of minimum wages can be removed and an
appropriate role for them found (pp. 183-184).
See Donges, Spinanger (1983, pp. 1-5) for estimates of




wage legislation in the United States. Given the importance
of picking up the total impact of such interferences in the
labor market and the failure of some earlier studies (e.g.
Kaitz, 1970) this aspect was re-investigated empirically.
Not knowing what other factors might be influencing the
LFPRs of the various cohorts it was decided to define
changes in the differential between LFPRs for nonwhite and
white youth cohorts as evidence of changes in unemployment
levels. Vis-a-vis a model in which unemployment rates serve
as the dependent variable, it was expected to find that
elasticities vis-a-vis minimum wages and relative labor
2
supply would be larger .
In its functional form the model - using OLS regression
analysis and run over the period 1954-1975 for six labor
force cohorts - is structured as follows:
In RUR.
or = aQ + b1 In REMIN + b2 In RLF ^ + b3 In CAP
In RURADJ^
i
The two dependent variables were defined as follows:
That is, the extent to which the unemployed and the labor
force change by the same percentage amount, the unem-
ployment rate remains the same.
2
In addition to the impact of these two variables the
results will also embody the impact of changes in dis-
crimination. Assuming that racial' discrimination on the
part of employers was being reduced over this period - or
at least not increased - the results will not be biased
upward.- 14 -





i = relative unemployment rate of cohort i
URi
URWl
= unemployment rate of cohort i
= unemployment rate of cohort male white 35-4 4
35-44 years
the relative unemployment rate adjusted for labor for
2
participation rate differences (RURADJ^ .) :
RURADJ,




RUR. or RURADJ. (as opposed to UR.) was chosen to elimi-
nate some of the cyclical disturbances and thus avoids a
serious error made in other investigations where such an
adjustment was accomplished by including an unemployment
rate as an independent variable. Furthermore, the selec-
tion of the cohort MW~,-_44 years as the denominator avoids
self-induced changes in the RUR for all other age groups.
Although the assumption about a zero differential between
LFPRs ignores the socio-economic determinants of LFPRs, in
the initial years the differential was indeed small or
even in favor of the nonwhites. It is hence assumed that,
although this adjusted unemployment rate might be dis-
torted somewhat by impact of changing determinants of
LFPRs, it nonetheless does a better job of capturing
relative unemployment differentials over time than a
comparison of RURs.- 15 -
RURADJ . = relative unemployment rate of i nonwhite age
cohort adjusted for age specific differences in
LFPRs between whites and nonwhites,
LFPR^. labor force participation rate of i white
= or
nonwhite cohort
. = unemployment rate of i nonwhite age cohort.
A comparison of RUR and RURADJ is given in Table 2a.
The independent variables included are:
REMIN = real minimum wage rate constructed by deflating
the minimum wage rate by the increase in consumer
price index
RLF. = relative labor force of cohort i - calculated
analogous to RUR (denominator is labor force
cohort LPMW35_44)
1
CAP = capacity utilization indicator computed by
centering the percent deviations of GNP (constant
dollars) from an exponential trend at 100
This variable picks up the impact of the relative increase
in the labor force vis-a-vis control cohort. The larger
the increase, and the more rigid the wages, the greater
the increase in unemployment.
2
CAP helps pick up cyclical fluctuations still in RUR.
These fluctuations are the direct result of hiring pol-
icies where the most competitive cohorts are first to be
removed from the ranks of the unemployed. Hence the lowest
competitive groups will have the highest elasticities. For
evidence of the impact of minimum wages on this elasticity
see Donges, Spinanger (1983, pp. 1-5).- 16 -
Table 2 - Minimum Wages and Relative Unemployment Rates Adjusted for LFPR Differentials
Table 2a - Comparison between Unadjusted and Adjusted RURs







































































Table 2b - Comparison of Regression Results Using Unadjusted and Adjusted RURs
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Source: Own calculations based on data from Bureau of Labor Statistics.- 17 -
The results (presented in Table 2b) show that the elas-
ticities for REMIN (in 2 cases) and for RLF (in 3 cases) did
increase considerably for the nonwhite males. For nonwhite
females the results do not fit quite as well into the ex-
pected picture - only one of the unemployment elasticities
is larger, but RLF did increase significantly in 3 cases.
For the females, one possible reason can be found in the
relatively parallel tracks followed by LFPRs for white and
nonwhite females up through the early 70s. Only since the
mid 70's has there been a shift, which was accordingly
reflected in the RURADJs (Table 2a)
1.
As concerns the second aspect - the crowding out of the
least competitive groups from covered sectors into non-
covered (or less covered) sectors - it can be expected to
find that the wage rates in the noncovered (or less covered)
sector will be more flexible to allow the increased demand
for jobs to be accommodated. Likewise it can be assumed that
those labor force cohorts whose expectation wage rates are
lower will - ceteris paribus - be able to be employed more
easily. Since the minimum wage legislation in the United
States is so conceived that certain areas have remained
uncovered, it is possible to investigate this subject by
examining what has happened to newsboys. This labor force
cohort represents an excellent example because minimum wage
2
legislation has completely exempted it from coverage .
As can be seen in Table 3 the youngest newsboy cohort, i.e.
the cohort with presumably the lowest wage expectations, has
increased its relative share at the expense of the older
It might be noted that a regression run with shift and
slope dummies for REMIN after 1974 reveal the posited
positive elasticities.
2
See par. 335 of the Fair Labor Standards Act: "The pro-
visions of sections 6,7 and 12 (minimum wages, overtime
pay and child labor regulations) shall not apply with
respect to any employee engaged in the delivery of news-
papers to the consumer ..." (Commerce Clearing House,
Inc., 1974, p. 92).- 18 -
cohorts. That newsboys are not a dying breed - a development
which might otherwise distort the results - can be concluded
from the last column - they have actually increased their
share by over 100%.
As far as the earnings of newsboys is concerned the hypo-
thesized slower rate of increase can indeed be observed
(Table 4) , when the earnings of the occupational heading
clerical and sales - chosen to represent the development of
earnings in a similar occupation - are compared with the
earnings of newsboys. Whereas the share of those who earned
less than $ 1000 in clerical/sales group fell by over 80%,
the newsboys reveal a decrease of less than 30%, and this
would no doubt have been far less in the earnings of the
14-15 year olds had been included in the 1970 figures. In
other words the uncovered sector - because of wage flexi-
bility - was able to absorb a certain amount of those who -
on account of the increase in minimum wages (i.e. wage
inflexibility) - could not otherwise procure a job in
2
covered sectors .
Unfortunately, neither wage rates nor earnings are avail-
able on an age-cohort basis. Median earnings are also not
available on a comparable basis for the various censuses,
so it was assumed that the distribution of earnings should
reflect average earnings.
Of course, even if wages were completely flexible the
absorptive capacity of a given sector would be limited by
certain constraints. Furthermore, if the wage rate in the
uncovered sector drops below the threshold wage for entry
into the labor market (the intersection of the labor
supply curve with the wage rate) then participation in
non-labor market activities will be the result. This might
possibly be the case for certain older youth cohorts,
whose acceptance wage could lie above the equilibrium wage
in the noncovered sector. To the extent that this occurs,
the younger youth cohorts, who have a lower acceptance
wage, could possibly profit from it.- 19 -
Table 3 - The Role of an Uncovered Sector and Relative Employment Shares
of Male Age Cohorts - 1940, 1950, 1960, 1970
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Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, Census of Population, General Summary,
1940, Vol. Ill, Pt. 1, Tab. 80; 1950, Vol. II, Pt. 1, Tab. 132;
1960, Tab. 212; 1970, Tab. 239.
Table 4 - Earnings of Newsboys and Clerical/Sales Occupations


















Those earning less than 999 $ as % of all earners.
Excludes 14-15 year olds.
Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, Census of Population,
1940: Vol. Ill, Part 1, Table 72
1950: P-E No. 18, Table 19
1960: PC(2) - 7B, Table 25
1970: PC(2) - 7A, Table 16.- 20 -
It would seem quite evident that the impact of minimum wages
- like all measures increasing the relative price of labor -
causes significant shifts in the demand for those labor
force cohorts whose wage rates would otherwise be below the
minimum wage rate. To the extent that these shifts induce
production to be restructured in a more capital intensive
direction a ratchet effect is likely to result, making a
rescinding of the minimum wage likely not to cause employ-
ment of those unemployed. The ratchet effect is thus no
doubt one of the reasons for the steady increase in the
unemployment rates for the less competitive labor force
cohorts in the U.S. Also working in the same direction is
the upward shift in the demand for labor with higher levels
of human capital. Whereas earlier a strong back represented
a useful trait to help get and keep a job, today it is a
strong head. Since relative education levels are indicators
of relative human capital levels, those with lower levels of
education - and hence lower levels of pay - are those who
will be most affected by minimum wage levels or changes ;
therein. Evidence of this can be gathered indirectly by
examining the development of unemployment rates by specific
labor force cohorts over a twenty year period (1950-1970)
during which the minimum wage legislation in the U.S. was
rapidly expanded and compare them with indicators of
changes in levels of human capital. As can be seen in Table
5 there is indeed a high correlation between changes in
levels of human capital of labor force cohorts and changes
in unemployment rates. If the table included changes in the
labor force and relative wage level changes as well it would
probably fairly well cover the 'reasons' for changes in
unemployment rates. Particularly if the youth cohorts were
included with an appropriate human capital indicator the
During this period the coverage was increased from about
55% to over 75% of nonsupervisory employees in the private
sector. The minimum wage which averaged about 50% of
average hourly earnings throughout the period, was
increased from $ 0.75 (1950) to $ 1.60 (1970).- 21 -
1 2























































































1 % change in share of those in labor force with high school degree and
1-3 years of college.
% change in unemployment rates.
Source: Own calculations based on U.S. Department of Commerce (1950,
Table 9; 1970, Table 9).- 22 -
impact of minimum wage legislation would become noticeable
as the increase in the coverage of youth employment from 30%
to almost 70% was far greater than for total coverage.
Contract minimum wages and lump-sum pay increases as agreed
upon between unions and employers.act in a fashion similar
to minimum wages. In the former case they act as wage floors
- as do minimum wages - and are binding regardless of pro-
ductivity differences - hence they bestow wage structures
with a certain degree of rigidity. In the latter case, the
lump-sum wage increases up wage levels more for those wor-
kers whose productivity levels can be assumed to be rela-
tively low. Thus the relationship between wages and produc-
tivity for these cohorts is shifted in a direction which
causes employers to consider substitute factors.
While Lewis's seminal book (1963) contains answers to a
wealth of questions on the impact of unions, it wasn't until
recently that a filtering out of the impact of personal
characteristics (e.g. education, prior work experience,
etc.) became possible (Ashenfelter, 1978) so that a closer
look at the direct impact of unions on wages could be made.
Among other things Ashenfelter (p. 33) shows that over time
the wage differential between union and nonunion wages has
increased significantly. It was during this time period that
the United States shifted from a fast-growing economy, with
excess demand to one of slower growth and 'shocked' by the
first round of oil price increases. Despite these.devel-
opments - and despite a decline in union membership - unions
were still able to increase their share of pay increases.
Given the picture drawn for the USA in Diagram 1 the rest of
the economy was obviously subjected to lower increases.and
no doubt also relegated to some extent to the secondary
labor force, where they will be subjected to larger employ-
ment fluctuations in the future, particularly if the above
mentioned ratchet effect applies. While union members were- 23 - .






































Source: Adapted from Ashenfelter (1978) pp. 33 and 35.
able to rake in their quasi-monopoly wage differentials up
through the 70s, they became haunted by these demands around
and after the turn of the decade and as the impact of the
prolonged recession on top of large structural shifts caused
unions to have to make large concessions should the com-
panies in which they were employed survive.
Similar studies on the impact of unions on relative wages
have been carried out for other countries (see Metcalf,
1977, for a summary of U.K. literature), but in only a few
is the full impact of unions fully captured . That is,
information on the cost of fringe benefits to the employer
is often not adequately included. Knowing that particularly
For instance Mincer (1981) estimated that a 10% increase
in union wages would increase the union/nonunion fringe
benefit ratio by 16% (p. 33).- 24 -
here the unions exert considerable pressure to make work and
working conditions more 'pleasant' it would seem obvious
that considerable sums of money are spent without a given
worker realizing that they are part of his paycheck. How-
ever, these nonpecuniary benefits are quite pecuniary to the
employers and they cause a further wedge to be driven be-
tween the supply and demand for labor. This being the case
it would seem difficult to be able to concur with the 0.14%
welfare loss estimated by Rees (1963) and often presented as
evidence of the trivial impact of unions.
The impact of unions on the allocation of resources via
higher relative wages for union employees, less flexibility
in wage structures and political pressure groups results -
according to Olson (1982, p. 219) - in higher unemployment
levels in those parts of the U.S. where the degree of union-
ization is the highest. As concerns the first two aspects -
together with minimum wages - an empirical analysis of their
impact on unemployment levels has been carried out for the
U.S. using 1970 state-level data. Three overall indicators
of employment problems have been used as follows:
U = unemployment rate calculated as unemployed in % of
respective civilian labor force cohort (M-= males;
F = females; B = blacks; W = whites)
UMIG = unemployment rate (as above) adjusted for those
who migrated, i.e. assuming they left because of
inadequate job possibilities
dEMP = change in employment from 1960 to 1970, i.e. a
ratio of 1970 to 1960
The explanatory variables included the following:
The signs in () represent the expected sign of the cor-
relation coefficient; for dEMP the sign is reversed.- 25 -
UNION = % of workers organized in unions (+)
MINV7AGE = national minimum wage level variable calculated
by subtracting minimum wage level ($ 1.60) from
average wage level.in state. It is assumed that
the greater the differential, the less likely
there will be an impact on employment levels (-)
MINSTATE = minimum wage levels set by states - it comp-
lements the national minimum wage rates (+)
COVER = estimated level of coverage of minimum wage
legislation by state; calculated by applying
national industrial coverage rates to the state
industrial structure of employment for 1970 (+)
While the results of the analysis in Table 7 should not be
overinterpreted they would seem to be more in line with
Hayek's (1980) contention, that unions are the chief cause
of unemployment, than with Rees's above-mentioned minimal
impact. In 6 cases UNION proved to be significantly cor-
related (with the right sign) with indicators of employment
problems, whereas the other determinants proved to be cor-
related in only 1 or 2 cases . Actually it is surprising -
in light of the wealth of studies showing a negative impact
of minimum wages - that the minimum wage variables don't
prove to be more significant. However, if, for instance, the
MINWAGE column is examined - specifically the shift in the
MR PR Mf
1 T^R
sign between U ' and UMIG ' - one reason for the
insignificance becomes evident: migration out of the states
where MINWAGE was low into states where it was high.
It should be noted that the calculations were carried out
with only 41 observations as 10 observations were dis-
carded because the black labor force was considered to be
too small to adequately represent labor market conditions
in the entire state. Thus to keep all calculations com-
parable only 41 states were entered into the calculations.- 26 -
Table 7 - Unions, Minimum Wages and Employment Problems in the U.S.



































































































































































Source: Own calculations based on data from Bureau of the Census and
Bureau of Labor statistics. - Data can be supplied upon request.- 27 -
An additional important factor causing the impact of unions
to be the most significant variable stems from its indirect
influence as a political pressure group rather than directly
via wages and wage structures. Hence aging industries re-
ceive special treatment - for instance through protection -
and are kept alive beyond the point where they are effi-
cient . Since union pressure is often complemented by press-
ure from employers the actual impact exerted by unions is
quite large.
As concerns the case of lump-sum payments it is difficult to
come up with specific examples, but in Germany - where the
degree of unionization is higher than the U.S. - it is poss-
ible to analyze the lowest wage groups, knowing that these
were being aimed at by unions with such payments. The pur-
pose of these lump-sum increases was - as noted earlier - to
add a social component to wage increases. But what they have
probably done - just like the minimum wages in the U.S. - is
to crowd these groups out of the labor market or at least
keep new entrants out - given the relative increases shown
in Table 8, another conclusion can hardly be drawn. A simi-
lar development took place in connection with the compen-
sation of apprentices in Germany. At a time when, the baby
boom was beginning to come into the labor market, wages for
apprentices were increased considerably. Over the ten year
period ending in 1981 first year compensation for appren-
tices had increased at least a third faster than compen-
sation for skilled workers. Along with the change in the
training system in Germany at the end of the 60s, which
burdened firms with many obligations to ensure that up-
to-date training was offered, the flexibility of the system
was decreased rather than increased.
The fact that many MFA industries are located in the prob-
lem areas in most OECD countries, but in the growth areas
in developing countries is a case in point here.- 28 -

































































Source: Calculated from Soltwedel (1983)
Social Aspects
Maternity leave was introduced into industrialized soci-
eties, to protect - in the prenatal and postnatal period -
the well-being of those women who were employed outside the
folds of the family. Already by 1919 the ILO had constructed
a set of minimum guidelines which were to be applied to all
women without exception. These guidelines - concerning the
length of leave (6 weeks prenatal and 6 weeks postnatal),
financial considerations, the obligation of employers and
the right of the mother to nurse the baby during work -
still constitute to a large degree the maternity leave laws
as they exist in most industrialized countries. That is to
say, most governments in Europe have come to the conclusion
that childbearing and the protection of mothers should be
supported by society - as a matter of fact this is even
explicitly stated in the German constitution.- 29 -
The protection of future mothers begins with restrictions
placed on their employment and the tasks they can perform
during their pregnancy. Likewise various arrangements about
job tenure (security) and total inability to work have been
established so-that a considerable amount of protection
around child-bearing women has been established and employ-
ers have but little leeway in what they are allowed to do.
In connection with the length of leave many European coun-
tries have extended the postnatal period in recent years so
that over six months are available in Germany, Italy and
Sweden (see Table 9). While Netherlands (with 12 weeks) is
at the bottom end of the scale in Europe, in the United
States expectant mothers usually have to take sick leave or
even vacation to cover at least the immediate pre- and post-
natal period.
In addition to the leave arrangements generous compensation
is made to cover most of wages and salaries foregone. These
are financed by insurance schemes (public and private),
government transfer payments and the employers. In Germany,
for instance 100% of the average pay in the three months
prior to pregnancy are remunerated, whereby the Federal
Government pays a maximum of 400 DM, the (public) insurance
companies assume a minimum of 3.50 DM/day or a maximum of 25
DM/day and the employer finances the rest (through the end
of the immediate maternity period). In the United States, on
the other hand, there are virtually no legal requirements
dictating financial assistance by either the government or
the employer. The insurance coverage likewise tends to be
minimal - only in the case of Aid for Dependent Children
(AFDC) does the government provide financial subsidies (see
Moore, Hofferth (1979) pp. 125-158)
1.
Even the ILO guideline concerning time off from work (one
hour per day - fully paid - in Germany) to nurse children
has been realized. In a recent case in Germany an employer
lost a case (in a lower court) against a woman who still















































Affecting working women; in Sweden working persons with
m = month; w = week; d = days. 3For those working at least
4Payment for extended leave *



































more than 4- 500 SK income per year.
1-484.- 31 -
All this together means that considerable costs are borne by
employers to pay for part of the maternity leave, pay for
replacements during the leave period and reorganize pro-
duction schedules so as to be able to comply with the legal
obligations. While larger companies, with a reservoir of
potential substitutes, can relatively easily retailor work
schedules, smaller companies have considerable difficulties,
particularly if highly qualified personnel are affected.
Thus the more that is done to upgrade and expand benefits
accruing to women bearing children - no doubt an admirable
social goal - the greater the hesitancy on part of the em-
ployer to employ them in responsible positions and invest in
them human capital. The result is a tendency to employ women
during their childbearing age in more marginal positions -
positions where they are most likely to be subjected to
greater employment instability. As a matter of fact if the
regulations in Table 9 are compared with unemployment levels
for women it can be seen that - generally speaking - unem-
ployment is the highest or increased the most where the
regulations are most liberal.
Paid sick/convalescence leave: that employees become sick is
nothing new, but that employees should be given time off
from work and then receive all medical bills paid for, is
something which has been realized in Germany within the last
50 years, but in the United States only partially . Paid
sick leave for white-collar workers in Germany was insti-
continued from p. 28:
was 5 years old. While overturned by an appellate court in
the meantime - a decision which will probably be appealed
- the case shows quite well the potential moral hazard
1
such laws can engender.
In Germany state-supported health insurance is based to a
large extent on laws and regulations dating back to 1883
under Bismarck (Gesetz iiber die Krankenversicherung der
Arbeiter) and 1911 (Reichsversicherungsordnung). In the
U.S. it was during the Kennedy-Johnson era that state run
health insurance came into being but only for the aged
(Health Insurance Act for the Aged).- 32 -
tuted in 1931 - blue-collar workers at this time received
only 50% of their basic pay beginning with the fourth day
of sick leave. In 1957 this was improved (90% of basic pay
for 6 weeks beginning with the third day of leave) and fin-
ally in 1970 full parity was reached with the white-collar
workers.
In the United States - aside from Medicare for pensioners
and Medicaid for the poor as well as special laws in five
states - there is no legal requirement for the employer to
pay for sick leave or health insurance. Most contracts cov-
ering such areas are thus made through the employer with a
private insurance company in the form of a group policy .
Thereby it can be found that sick pay is often far less than
actual pay and the length of benefits extends from 13-52
weeks (Seffen (1980), p. 31)
2.
If the existence of such policies increases the possibility
of moral hazard, then for sure West Germany would be a can-
didate. This possibility would be reinforced by employment
security laws which limit the possibility of employers to
rid themselves of sick employees. As can be seen in Table 10
the level of benefits is relatively high in Germany and
those in the United States quite low. Accordingly the cost
to employers is quite high and has risen considerably over
the years from 1.7% of gross pay in 1966 to 6.3% in 1980.
And in the time period between 196 9 and 1972 - during which
blue-collar workers finally received full benefits - the
It is estimated that about 90% of the population is
covered by health insurance (Davis, Rowland (1982) p.
523) .
As it stands now those becoming unemployed in the United
States - because they are no longer attached to a company
- are not covered by health insurance. A bill currently in
Congress proposes to change this and make employers pay
part of the bill for a number of months following the
employees discharge.- 33 -
jump was from 1.7% to 5.9% (Hemmer (1981) p. 38). While it
is generally refuted that the liberal health insurance sys-
tem (i.e. moral hazard) is responsible for this trend, Dia-
gram 3 helps to clarify the issue somewhat: there has not
only been an upward trend in the % of those on sick leave,
the cyclical movements testify to the loosening and stiff-
ening of qualms about becoming sick.
Unemployment compensation: at roughly the same time that
social laws were being struck down by the courts in the
2
United States towards the end of the last century , insti-
tutions in European countries were being spawned to shoulder
the financial burden engendered by unemployment. While at
first these were basically organized by unions - e.g. in
Germany - in most cases they gave way to state operated
systems at a later point in time. Of the EEC countries
(excluding Greece) only Belgium, France and the Netherlands
had no state run or supported unemployment insurance (UI)
system by the late 1920s. Today, however, UI in most OECD
countries not only provides relatively high compensation
rates (see Table 11), it has been extended to cover most of
the active labor force, aside from being complemented by
myriads of other policies to help redirect unemployed human
resources into areas presumed to be promising (for an over-
It might be added that for blue-collar workers alone the
increase was from 1.4% to 7.08%. Also of interest is the
fact that 70% of those sick are so on Monday or Friday,
but only 4% on Wednesday.
2
For a particularly interesting overview of the develop-
ment, of American thought vis-a-vis - inter alia - econ-
omics, social legislation and the law see Commager (1950).
Risch (1981), p. 517 notes that in St. Gallen one of the
first compulsory unemployment insurance systems was organ-
ized on a local basis in 1895, but it lasted for only one
winter. The reasons for this failure were (1) low contrib-
utions by those who took advantage of the insurance the
most (seasonal workers) - this led to an outmigration to
the suburbs to avoid paying contributions; (2) the labor
exchanges failed; (3) the unemployed were not controlled,
so that many unemployed were working on the other side of















































































aWhite collar employees. 7 days for blue collar employees. From
8th - 30th day an amount equal to difference between 60% and gross
pay remunerated by employer.
 c90% of net pay for blue collar.
"% of net pay. eMinimum after 3 years of work; 66% for next 30
days. Leave increases by 10 days for each 5 more years of work
up to 90 days maximum.
 fWith 3 or more children increases to
66.6% after 31 days. 9Within a period of 3 years. ^For non-in-
terupted period. i-Lump-sum sick pay. jlncome related sick pay.
^Minimum. 166.6% after 20 days.
 mFor blue collar workers only.
nTaxable. °Within 3 years for same sickness. Pin the practice
only for those not qualified for initial sick pay by employer.
^Only in 6 states.
Source: Adapted from Seffen [1980] , pp. 33 and 37.
Diagram 3
Sick Leave and Business Cycles in Germany
Index ol capacity utilization
(ricM scale)
1955 1960 1S55 ' 1970 1975 1980
C wo'kers m "/. o* mon^oro^y m*mD4>ri m putrtic h«jl(h iniuronct Systwr.- 35 -
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1 Abbreviations used in this table: Emps. = employees; apprs. = apprentices; priv. = private; w = week(s); m = month(s);
d = day(s); Y = income; ind. = industry; yr(s). = year(s); -
 2 This table provides an overview of the highest level compen-
sation schemes. It does not include public assistance, welfare etc. which in many cases' increases benefits. Furtermore,
the statistics stem from various sources, thus incorrect representation of the various measures cannot be excluded - the
author would appreciate receiving corrections. - ^ Applies to branches with union funds. - * Required time to become eligible
in months, weeks or days of contribution/in last months or weeks prior to becoming unemployed; e.g. 12 w/12 m means 12 weeks
of contribution within the last 12 months are necessary to receive compensation.
Source: Based on 0 E C D (1979) end Volz (1980) .- 36 -
view of such policies in Austria, Sweden and West Germany
see Soltwedel (1982). And here the problem begins - not only
does moral hazard enter the picture, but various national
governments are finding out that financing all these schemes
is becoming expensive. This means that financial resources
must be drawn away from the other sources - ergo crowding
out occurs at a time when lower interest rates might prove
beneficial in prompting investment. But it is not merely a
matter of crowding out (in financial markets) but rather a
continually larger bite out of the paychecks of those still
working and a heavy burden on the employers . That usurping
of resources by governments is one determinant of unemploy-
ment was seen in Diagram 1.
The issue of moral hazard, as was shown in the case of
health insurance, cannot be ignored if economic efficiency
2 criteria are assumed to apply . Recalling Feldstein's (1973)
portrayal of a fictitious Massachusetts' worker who finds
that being unemployed for certain periods of time causes
disposable income to be decreased - at the most - only mar-
ginally, it should be noted that in Germany, until just
recently - it would have even been possible to increase
one's income by not working for a certain period of time
during the year as UI payments are not taxed.
It is not merely the moral hazard impact of UI alone but its
interaction with the numerous other laws and regulations
aimed at improving the social situation of workers and their
families thereby inducing costs to be borne by both employ-
ees and employers. If the package of benefits jacks up the
cost of employing workers beyond the point where employers
find it profitable to employ them, then an underutilization
of human capital is induced. Since the unemployed person may
For instance in Germany this has culminated in a special
law to place a surcharge on taxes due on high incomes, to
be paid back (without interest) in the years 1987 to 1989.
Risch (1981, p. 515) notes that already in 1907 the
problem of moral hazard was contemplated in connection
with state-run UI schemes.- 37 -
not suffer any financial hardship over the period he re-
ceives benefits, the reservation wage is often increased to
levels which do not correspond with human capital potential.
That is, the opportunity costs of non-work activities are
decreased - only over time does the reservation level de-
crease, particularly when UI benefits are exhausted . On the
other hand the existence of UI benefits may well free the
employer from qualms he might otherwise have and actually
engender greater unemployment because 'father state
1 will
2 take care of those released .
In the United States the UI system (officially introduced on
a nationwide basis in 1935) embodies an additional negative
incentive to stabilize employment. Here the Federal Govern-
ment cooperates with state governments but the firms alone
are required to pick up the tab for UI. Since the basis for
the firm level financing of UI is calculated on an experi-
ence rating of the individual firms according to the rate at
which they normally discharge employees - whereby a rather
low ceiling is applied - once the ceiling is reached the
firm can discharge workers at will without having to pay nay
more.
In addition to these destabilizing effects, the fact that
unemployment compensation rates (as well as welfare bene-
fits) differ across states causes migration flows to be
related to income maximization but not necessarily to a more
efficient allocation of resources (see Cebula, 1980). This
See for instance Fishe (1982) pp. 12-17. He also showed
that the lower the variance of wage offered the longer the
unemployment period.
2
Whereas UI is imposed from outside, in certain cases com-
panies have attempted to solve the problem on a micro
level. This was the case of Procter & Gamble which intro-
duced in 192 3 guaranteed employment. As a result of this
(and other earlier measures) labor turnover was noticeably
reduced and production costs were decreased by 5% (see
Nelson (1969) p. 58).- 38 -
can be demonstrated quite easily by examining migration
flows between the states in the U.S. Assuming that employ-
ment changes represent an appropriate indicator for job and
earnings potential one would expect that a positive corre-
lation exists between net migration and change in employ-














The variables are defined as follows:
MIGPOP. = net migration of cohort i in the years 1965-1970
as % of total population of cohort i in 1970 (T =
total; W = whites; N = nonwhites)
DEMP = change in total employment
INS = average level (in $) of weekly benefits over the
period 1960-1970
AFDC = average level (in $) of monthly aid for dependent
children
As can be seen in Table 12 white population cohorts react
strongly to changes in employment levels,but the black pop-
ulation seems to respond to unemployment insurance and wel-
fare benefits. One possible interpretation of this phenom-
enon is that blacks - because of barriers to entry (e.g.:
To avoid possible distortions by, those who are retired and
hence migrate for other reasons net migration and popula-
tion of these over 65 have been deleted from the respect-
ive cohorts.- 39 -
discrimination, minimum wages) in their state of origin -
have difficulties in procuring a job and hence maximize
their income by taking advantage of the social system.
In Germany neither do regional differences in unemployment
compensation levels exist nor are firms required to bear the
entire (direct) financial burden (as can be seen in Table 11
they share 3% equally). What remains is the impact of moral
hazard, the empirical substantiation of which - due to idio-
syncracies of the German labor market - has been stymied
m,i.i e I o '• Factors Influencing Interstate Migration in the





































" = significant at 10 % level.


















Source: Own calculations based on data from U.S. Dept. of Census.
This fits well into the statistics already presented
earlier where unemployment rates adjusted for net migra-
tion showed a significant correlation with a minimum wage
available, but ordinary unemployment rates didn't.- 40 -
(see e.g. Konig, Franz (1978) pp. 243-244) . What can be
observed, however, is that in cases where retraining is
possible, this path is often selected - perhaps without
regard to capabilities or demand - because the remuneration
is greater.
IV. Summary and Policy Conclusions
The various policies which have been discussed above have
steadily built rigidities into the labour market the extent
of which makes the conventionally discussed market imper-
fections (due to imperfect competition) look quite trivial.
Although the politicians and trade union leaders came to
believe that the continuous improvement of the terms and
conditions of employment could only be beneficial to the
active population, their policies have in fact greatly hand-
icapped the ability of the economy to absorb a growing
labor force. Well-intended measures actually drove out an
increasing number of workers from their jobs and prevent new
generations of workers from finding employment, they thus
provided social insecurity rather than security. The expla-
nation for this is twofold: on the one hand the policymakers
suffered from social policy illusions and on the other hand
the firms were required to finance most of the various meas-
ures, thus inducing a strong increase in labour costs beyond
the rate of growth of total factor productivity.
Translated into real world figures, Diagram 4 and Table 13
portray what such policies mean for Germany. It becomes
This includes the failure of the statistics to cover (a)
those willing to work but not registered because they
receive no unemployment compensation and (b) the impact on
unemployment statistics due to foreign workers leaving.
The impact of these and other regulations governing the
registering of the unemployed as well as policies intro-
duced to retrain unemployed or make their employment poss-
ible by providing subsidies (up to 90% of wage costs!) no
doubt leads to a masking over of the labor market move-
ments.Diagram 4
Development of Value Added, Labor Costs and Take-home Pay






























y A = Net take-home pay
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Source: See Diagram 4.- 43 -
evident that the various laws, regulations and agreements
have driven a large wedge between what employers have to pay
for labor and what employees actually take home; the share
of entrepreneurial income also decreased relatively. Looking
at it in marginal terms it can be determined that the share
of entrepreneurial income has been reduced by 25% in the two
periods and that total labor costs now account for 75% of
value added.
If the increase in wage costs since 196 6 were to be compared
with expenditures effected by the German Labor Office in
1980/81 (about 25 bill. DM) it turns out that government
expenditures are only slightly over 10% of the wage cost
increase. Can there be any question about the potential
leverage reducing wage costs can have in influencing em-
ployment levels? While it is true that these figures rep-
resent only the costs without taking into account the ben-
efits resulting from more leisure time and more generous
medical and social benefits, the question arises in this
respect if the cost of all these benefits was known - in-
cluding the unemployment created - would the population
still have opted for them?
What then are the alternatives available to ensure that
renumeration levels interface with productivity and labor
market flexibility allows a greater degree of response to
changing parameters? There are two basic approaches to this
problem; these can be labled the conventional solution and
the classical solution.
The conventional solution, which is discussed in many poli-
tical circles and finds support among some reputable eco-
nomists, calls for (i) an increase of nominal wages to in-
duce additional demand, (ii) a shortening of the working
hours to allow new jobs openings to be created and (iii)
active labor market policies to redeploy and reintegrate the- 44 -
unemployed. These three measures have two things in common:
they do not "solve" anything and they are of stop-gap na-
ture.
Let us turn now to the classical solution. The main dif-
ference vis-a-vis the conventional solution is not between
the goals themselves - both aim at creating more jobs -, but
rather between how effectively the goals are approached.
Conventional wisdom does not approach the factor determining
the demand for labor, i.e. what it costs. Furthermore, where-
as conventional wisdom says but little about the competi-
tiveness of the jobs to be created the classical approach
aims at creating internationally competitive jobs; this im
imperative in open economies facing continuous changes in
the international division of labor. What sort of measures
can be introduced to achieve this? Keeping in mind the above
mentioned negative impact of the measures influencing the
labor market, it would seem logical to focus on the role of
those institutions whose intervention into the functioning
of the labor market has caused problems to occur - i.e. the
government and unions.APPENDIX
Methods and Sources for Basic Data in Diagram 1
Unemployment, its Determinants and the Economic Environment
Selected OECD Countries 1960-1980
UnemploYment_rates
Data excerpted from Sorrentino (1978, Table 3) and
Moy (1982, Table 2). These unemployment rates are
- as opposed to using only national sources - com-
parable with one another.
Wages/employee - including fringe benefits - taken
from Argumente zu Unternehmerfragen (5/1982). For
1960 and 1965 data from OECD National Accounts
(compensation of employees).
Productivity calculated from OECD National Accounts
(value added) and OECD Labor Force Statistics.
Excerpted from OECD Economic Outlook, June 1982,
Table R 8. It is total outlays of government as per-
centage of GDP.
Profit_rate
Excerpted from Seidel (1983, pp. 290-293).
It is the ratio of net entrepreneurial income to
net assets.
GDP
In constant prices, taken from OECD National AccountsLabor_force
Total civilian labor force from OECD Labor Force
Statistics.
Competitiveposition
Own calculations of effective real exchange rate
(i.e. exchange rate divided by export prices) changes
vis-a-vis 15 other industrialized countries according

















in*The symbols represent the variables:
ERERC = effective real exchange rate changes for country
i between time t and t + n vis-a-vis countries
j = 1...m
ER = exchange rate
IM = total world imports
IM
1 1
. = total imports for countries i and j
EX = total world exports
1 = total exports for countries i and j
i
. = export price index for country i and j.
p
The first part of the expression - A.. - represents the
ERERC for exports of country i; the second part of the
expression - B.. - represents the ERERC for the imports
of country i. A_ and B2 are the export and import shares
respectively for country i (% of sum of exports plus im-
ports) with which both parts are weighted to produce
ERERC for total foreign trade.
The sixteen countries used in the calculation are: Austria,
Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Great
Britain, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden,
Switzerland and United States.
The data has been taken from IMF International Financial
Statistics.
Average for years 1975 and 1976.- 48 -
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